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This paper extends several existing learning models to investigate
their xed points (their long run predictions of play). The xed points
of the model are not necessarily at the Nash equilibria of the payo
matrices but are a function of both the Nash equilibria and the pa-
rameters of the model. The stability of these xed points also depends
on both the characteristics of payo matrix used and the parameters
of the model. These new ndings indicate that behaviour previously
thought to be inconsistent with theory may not necessarily be so.

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1 Introduction
All of economics deals with notions of equilibrium. These notions serve us
well in a static world, but as soon as we begin to apply these models we
encounter unanswered questions: how does one get to the equilibrium? how
long will it take? and where will we actually end up?
Nash equilibrium theory, applicable in some cases, is incomplete in the
case of multiple equilibria. Bayesian updating has been used to model peo-
ple's adjustments over time but its reliance on priors (and its assumptions
on the rationality of the players) precludes its use in all but the most basic
applications. What is needed, is a model of adjusting behaviour that can
predict where we will end up, how we will get there and how fast. This
could then be used in conjunction with models of equilibria to more ac-
curately predict out-of-equilibrium behaviour. Learning models may well
provide such an adjustment mechanism.
The models I will be considering have roots in the behavioral school of
psychology that was dominant in the rst half of the century. Much of the
psychology research on learning ended in the 1950's as the behavioral school
fell into disfavour (and was replaced by cognitive approaches). Recently,
there has been renewed interest in learning in psychology including work
by Friedman, Massaro, Kitzis & Cohen (1995) and Kitzis, Kelley, Berg,
Massaro & Friedman (1998).
Out of the pre-1950 tradition came the rote learning model (also known
as reinforcement learning, stimulus response or the law of eect). In these
models, successful strategies are reinforced and are more likely to be used
again. First formalized by Bush & Mosteller (1955); recent work on rein-
forcement models has come from Harley (1981), Cross (1983), Borgers &
Sarin (1996), Roth & Erev (1995),Erev & Roth (1998), and Tang (1996).
Belief models are another type of learning mechanism. Here, players
form beliefs about the state of the world next period and optimally respond
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to these beliefs and individuals are allowed to take into account things they
have not personally experienced. Examples of the simplest of this type of
learning include Cournot best response (Cournot 1863) and ctitious play
(Brown 1951). As mentioned previously, in Cournot learning, what hap-
pened last period is assumed to be the best predictor of what will happen
next period. In ctitious play, the opponent's average play over time is used
as the best predictor of their action next period. Other models of this type
include Cheung & Friedman (1997) and Fudenberg & Levine (1998) which
both allow for the weighting of past periods. Still more sophisticated are
the "sophisticated belief" models that provide complex models of opponent
behavior (Selten 1991, Stahl 1993, Stahl 1996, Stahl 1999a, Stahl 1999b).
Most recently, Camerer & Ho (1998c) show that the previously competing
simple belief and rote learning models can be nested in their Experience
Weighted Average (EWA) model, a hybrid model with belief and rote learn-
ing as special cases.
The goal of this paper is to present a model that allows the investiga-
tion of asymptotic stability in learning models and to investigate how these
models describe actual learning behaviour. The paper focuses on three by
three bimatrix games because they provide a crucial stepping stone from the
two by two bimatrix world to the more exible multi-choice world.
Learning models model the behaviour of individuals. In order to do this,
they build propensities for each possible action. As the relative propensity
for a particular action increases, the probability of playing that action in-
creases. Propensities are built out of the stream of payos perceived by
a player. Reinforcement learning rules give weight to payos from actions
experienced while belief learning rules incorporate all possible payos.
Empirical work so far has concentrated on comparing dierent models
in terms of their t and predictive ability with experimental data. Camerer
& Ho (1998b) and (1998a) nd that their hybrid model performs better
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than either of the other two approaches. Erev & Roth (1998) nd that
reinforcement models perform better and Feltovich (1998) nds that specic
model performance depends both on the design of the experiment and on
the comparison criterion.
The work to date has generally neglected two fundamental issues: the
implications of these models on the location, and the stability of the xed
points. If players were acting in a way consistent with the model, what long
run behaviour would we expect to see? Fudenberg & Levine (1998) and
Ellison & Fudenberg (2000) have begun to look at these issues for special
cases. However, the most common models are lacking this analysis.
This paper proposes a model that combines insights from Fudenberg &
Levine (1995) and Camerer & Ho (1998c) which in turn was built on Cheung
& Friedman (1998) and Roth & Erev (1995). The questions of xed points
and stability are examined.
2 The Model
The games I will be considering in this dissertation have payos that depend
on both your own action and the action of your opponent (your opponent
can be a single person or you can be playing against a group of opponents).
These games are repeated for a number of periods. Every period you and
your opponent simultaneously make choices among the available actions.
Everyone gets to see the payo consequences of these actions and you get to
make your next period's choice
1
. The payos are used to build the propen-




of individual i at time t for each action j is:
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The model can be applied more generally than this discussion indicates. The structure

































The numerator is a discounted sum of the stream of payos over time
and 
i




denominator normalizes the propensity so that the propensities at dierent
times can be directly compared. A discount near zero, would indicate a
Cournot type player who only uses payo information from the last period.
A player with a discount 
i















































which is the average of the payos to each choice over time (this is also
known as a Fictitious Play player).












and is a function of Æ
i
, a weight on the importance of the payos to actions
not chosen relative to that chosen. As Æ approaches 0, actions not chosen
have a smaller and smaller weight (they are no longer used) which corre-
sponds to reinforcement learning. At Æ = 1 we get pure belief learning and
the propensities are updated with all the payo information. Intermediate
values of Æ can be thought of as weak belief learning where you don't put as
much weight on actions you have not experienced. The action chosen by i
at time t is a vector c
i
t
(and is assumed to be a pure strategy vector
2
). The
state faced by i (what i's opponents are doing) at time t is s
i
t







, the elements sum to one since they represent distributions
of play over possible actions.
The actual payo function used in this analysis and in the experiments
is a function of a payo matrix M (with elements m
kl
). For a three choice
game, M is a 3x3 matrix and the payo function is:
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If an individual i had played c
i
2
= [1; 0; 0]
0
period 2 and had been faced




















































































































































If Æ = 1, this model is equivalent to a belief model where all possible
payos are weighted equally. If Æ = 0, we have the reinforcement learning
model where only the action chosen is used in the propensity. Relaxing
the assumption that the discount values in the numerator and denominator
are equal makes this model asymptotically equivalent to a continuous time
version of the EWA model
3
.
The model is a probabilistic model, the probability of an individual
choosing an action increases as the propensity for that action increases. To
3
The EWA model, as presented in Camerer and Ho (1998a,b,c), consists of the obser-
vation equivalent of past experience N(t) and the propensity P
j
i
(t) for action j at time t.
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map the propensities on to actions, the Logit probability response function
is used so that the probability of i's jth action c
i
t;j






















is the parameter. A 
i
near zero would indicate a misspecied
model while a large 
i
would indicate that the propensities do a good job of
explain the observed play. Negative 
i
values would suggest misspecication,
possibly due to higher order reasoning and anticipatory play in the sense of
Selten (1991).
The Logit has been used widely used in the literature on Learning
(Mookherjee & Sopher 1994, McKelvey & Palfrey 1995, Fudenberg & Levine
1998, Camerer & Ho 1998b). Other mapping functions are possible, but work
by Camerer & Ho (1998c) has shown little dierence between the Logit and
power response functions. Tang (1996) had similar results looking only at
reinforcement models. The Logit has the additional benet of allowing neg-
ative payos.
The initial N(0) and P(0) are updated after period 0 so that:






 N(t  1)  P
j
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; t  1:










































































The Logit is invariant to an additive constant on the propensities. In
order to estimate the model the probabilities are normalized relative to one
of the actions. The use of the Logit assumes the independence of irrelevant





, be independent of the remaining probabilities (Green 1993). This
implies that adding an alternative to the model, or changing the charac-
teristics of another alternative that is already included, will not change the
odds between actions j and k (Davidson & Mackinnon 1993), a plausible
constraint in this class of games.
It is important (but neglected in the literature so far) to look at this
model in terms of two characteristics: the xed points of the model in rela-
tion to the Nash equilibrium of the payo matrix, and the model stability
around each xed point. Fudenberg & Levine (1998) argue that learning
models can suggest useful ways to evaluate and modify the traditional equi-
librium concepts (including Nash Equilibria). Also, in order to apply learn-
ing models in anything but the shortest time frames, it is necessary to have
some idea of the long run predictions of the models. I consider the xed
points and stability of this model in turn.
3 Fixed points
The xed points for this model depend both on the Nash equilibria of the
payo matrix used and on the parameters of the model.
A xed point is a set of probabilities (Q
?
) that map back on to them-
selves. In other words, players facing the state dened by a xed point choose
actions with probabilities that again yield the same xed point. Assuming












(Æ; c = Q
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Thus, propensities are static when play remains at (Q
?
).
The xed point(s) (Q
?








































































is the probability of
play at the xed point.
This is a transcendental equation and not analytically solvable. The
smaller the Logit parameter (), the more there is a tendency towards the
center of the simplex (1/3,1/3,1/3) so that:
 = 0 ) Q





and continuous between. As mentioned previously,  is assumed non nega-
tive and small values would indicate a misspecication of the model.
The parameter Æ (the weight on actions not chosen relative to that cho-
sen) is bounded between 0 and 1. Larger values equally weight all actions by
their potential payos and should slow down the movement away from the
center of the simplex as  becomes large. The eects of the interactions of
the parameters and how they interact with the payo matrices (and there-
fore the NE of the payo matrices) are diÆcult to quantify. As a result, we
will rely on numerical simulations.
Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show how the xed points change
as the parameters (Æ,  and ) change using two dierent payo matrices.
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Figure 1: Matrix 2- Distribution of xed points using dierent parameters
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Figure 2: Matrix 4- Distribution of xed points using dierent parameters
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Table 1: Matrix 2 Fixed points and stability simulations
Eigen- Eigen-
Æ   %Top %Middle %Bottom value1 value2 Stable
0 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.37 0.19 0.44 -1.10 -1.10 1
0.5 0.37 0.19 0.44 -0.33 -0.33 1
1 0.37 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.54 0
0.5 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.16 0
1 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.99 0.00 0.00 1.68 0.23 0
0.5 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.07 0
1 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.07 -1.09 0
0.5 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 -0.33 0
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.46 0.15 0.39 -4.25 -1.49 1
0.5 0.46 0.15 0.39 -1.28 -0.45 1
1 0.46 0.15 0.39 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.82 0.05 0.13 -1.50 -1.50 1
0.5 0.82 0.05 0.13 -0.45 -0.45 1
1 0.82 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.96 0.01 0.03 -1.11 -1.11 1
0.5 0.96 0.01 0.03 -0.34 -0.34 1
1 0.96 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 0.99 0.00 0.01 -1.33 -1.33 1
0.5 0.99 0.00 0.01 -0.40 -0.40 1
1 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0
1 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.50 0.12 0.38 -7.39 -1.79 1
0.5 0.50 0.12 0.38 -2.22 -0.54 1
1 0.50 0.12 0.38 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.71 0.04 0.24 -4.25 -4.25 1
0.5 0.71 0.04 0.24 -1.28 -1.28 1
1 0.71 0.04 0.24 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.83 0.02 0.15 -3.70 -3.70 1
0.5 0.83 0.02 0.15 -1.11 -1.11 1
1 0.83 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 0.90 0.01 0.10 -3.32 -3.32 1
0.5 0.90 0.01 0.10 -1.00 -1.00 1
1 0.90 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0
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Table 2: Matrix 4 Fixed points and stability simulations
Eigen- Eigen-
Æ   %Top %Middle %Bottom value1 value2 Stable
0 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.35 0.29 0.37 -1.73 -3.29 1
0.5 0.35 0.29 0.37 -0.52 -0.99 1
1 0.35 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.95 2.49 -1.53 0
0.5 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.75 -0.46 0
1 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.00 0.00 0.99 6.18 -1.38 0
0.5 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.86 -0.42 0
1 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.43 -1.40 0
0.5 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.24 -0.42 0
1 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.35 0.26 0.39 -2.60 -4.50 1
0.5 0.35 0.26 0.39 -0.78 -1.35 1
1 0.35 0.26 0.39 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.25 0.15 0.61 -1.40 -2.87 1
0.5 0.25 0.15 0.61 -0.42 -0.86 1
1 0.25 0.15 0.61 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.95 1.50 -2.67 0
0.5 0.03 0.01 0.95 0.45 -0.80 0
1 0.03 0.01 0.95 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 0.01 0.00 0.99 2.13 -2.59 0
0.5 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.64 -0.78 0
1 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0
1 0 0.1 0.33 0.33 0.33 -6.91 -2.30 1
0.5 0.33 0.33 0.33 -2.08 -0.69 1
1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0
0.5 0.1 0.35 0.25 0.40 -5.74 -3.43 1
0.5 0.35 0.25 0.40 -1.73 -1.03 1
1 0.35 0.25 0.40 0.00 0.00 0
1 0.1 0.32 0.18 0.51 -4.42 -4.42 1
0.5 0.32 0.18 0.51 -1.33 -1.33 1
1 0.32 0.18 0.51 0.00 0.00 0
1.5 0.1 0.23 0.09 0.67 -4.76 -3.06 1
0.5 0.23 0.09 0.67 -1.43 -0.92 1
1 0.23 0.09 0.67 0.00 0.00 0
2 0.1 0.14 0.03 0.83 -4.43 -2.48 1
0.5 0.14 0.03 0.83 -1.33 -0.75 1
1 0.14 0.03 0.83 0.00 0.00 0
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has a single Nash equilibrium at (1,0,0), Matrix 4 is a HDB matrix (from


















with a mixed Nash equilibrium at (2=3; 1=3; 0) and a pure Nash equilibrium
at (0; 0; 1).
The location of the xed points depends only on  and Æ and not . Fig-
ures 3 and 4 show how the xed points change as lambda changes (allowing
13
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for dierent values of  and Æ). As expected, in both matrices, small values
of lambda do "pull" the xed point to the center of the simplex. As the
multiplier becomes large, the xed points move towards a pure strategy NE
action. The importance of the underlying matrix can be seen by comparing
the behavior in the two matrices. Matrix 4 has all of the xed points in a
narrow band between the center of the simplex and the Nash. Matrix 2 how-
ever exhibits a more complex arrangement, where the xed points depend
heavily on Æ. When Æ < 0:1 the xed points are between the center of the
simplex and (0,0,1). This is highly inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium
of the payo matrix. Further work is needed to determine why this is the
case. Figures 5 and 6 show how the xed points depend on Æ by identifying
the points were Æ <= 0:5 and Æ > 0:5. Note that the in Matrix 2, eect of
small Æ values (Æ < 0:1) can be clearly seen and in Matrix 4, the mixed NE
is not the limit of the xed points.
14



















Fixed points with delta <=0.5     Fixed points with delta>0.5     Nash Equilibria   
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Fixed points with delta <=0.5    Fixed points with delta >0.5    Nash Equilibria
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4 Stability
4.1 Single population games
To look at the stability of the xed points of a model we need to look at
the behavior predicted by the model in the region around the xed point.





























































) d : (20)









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A explicitly lists the elements of the Jacobian.
Although this is a three choice game, the system (assuming a single
population game) is actually two dimensional since probabilities sum to
one. Using Haigh's (1975) theorem to reduce the matrix, the entries of the




























see Appendix A for the elements of the Z.
For the model to be asymptotically stable, the eigenvalues of the lin-
earized equation around the xed point have to have negative real parts

























































Proposition 1 Let M be a 3x3 single population game, and
_
P be the equa-
tion of movement over time. Let Z be the matrix dened above with ele-
ments fz
i;j
g. Then, an interior xed point Q
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Proof: For a interior xed point to be asymptotic stable, both eigenvalues











second eigenvalue will have negative real parts. The asymptotic stability
then depends on the rst Eigenvalue and its square root term. If there














 0) there is





















































































































































> 0, the rst eigenvalue can not be negative and
thus, there is no asymptotic stability.
The role of ln in determining asymptotic stability is important since all
of the elements of Z are factors of ln (and thus both eigenvalues are factors
of ln as well). When  = (0; 1), ln < 0. Values of   1 lead to ln  0
and thus change the signs of the eigenvalues. Matrices and parameter values
that are asymptotically stable with  = (0; 1) will not be asymptotically
stable with   1 (though the converse is not necessarily true). Values of  >
1 correspond to a discount rate consistent with "imprinting": where initial
periods have more weight than subsequent periods. The special case  = 1
19
corresponds to Fictitious play and leads to asymptotically neutral stability
4
.
It is also important to note that this is the only place the parameter  enters
in the asymptotic stability of a xed point Q

. Assuming  = (0; 1), it is
the underlying matrix and  and Æ determine stability. Of course,  aects
the convergence rate for stable xed points.
4.2 Stability in two population games
In the case of two (or more) population games, the stability requirement
changes. The P
t

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The intuition is that with Fictitious play the process stagnates: people don't respond








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and using the same Taylor expansion and re-denition of P as with a single












































































































































































































































































































































see Appendix B for all of the elements of this matrix.
The dimension of this matrix must then be reduced (although there are
three choices available to both groups, the probabilities of these three choices
must sum to one, thus there are only two dimensions for each group). As is
the case with the single population, for there to be asymptotical stability,
the eigenvalues of the reduced matrix must have negative real parts.
21
Figure 7: Matrix 2: Stable and non-stable xed points assuming  = 0:5
and allowing Æ to increment between 0 and 1 by 0.01 and  to increment
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Figure 8: Matrix 4: Stable and non-stable xed points assuming  = 0:5
and allowing Æ to increment between 0 and 1 by 0.01 and  to increment
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4.3 Stability in specic matrices {Single population games
Tables 1 and 2 show the eigenvalues and stability characteristics for Matrices
2 and 4 for a variety of xed points. In both cases, when Æ is very small
it is very diÆcult to achieve stability
5
. Since rote learning models require
Æ = 0, rote learning models would generally not be stable in these cases. As
predicted, for both matrices,  = 1 leads to non-stability. In Matrix 4, this
leads to the points around the pure strategy NE not being stable while the
xed points nearer to the center of the simplex are stable. The larger , the
more likely the xed point is to be stable. Figures 7 and 8 show the same
information graphically. As can be seen from the gures, there are denite
regions of stability and non-stability.
Figures 9 and 10 show the regions of stability and non-stability as a
function of the parameter space. As was shown in the previous section, the
discount parameter () does not aect the region of stability.
It is now possible, in conjunction with actual estimates of parameters
from experimental data to have specic predictions of long run behaviour
for a matrix ??.
5 Conclusion
This paper has set out to ll gaps in the theory of learning in games. A
continuous time model is proposed and the conditions for its xed points
and their stability properties are derived. This, together with the payo
matrix, provides a prediction about expected behaviour. As expected, the
Nash equilibrium of the payo matrix is important. However, the parame-
ters of the model also play a large role in both the location of the xed points
and in their stability. One of the features of this model is that with slight
modications {adding initial propensities, allowing the discounts in the nu-
5
Unless  is also small.
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merator and denominator to be independent of each other and adding an
initial experience term{ the Camerer & Ho (1998c) EWA model can be re-
covered and hence the Cheung & Friedman (1997) and Roth & Erev (1995)
models as well.
The location of the xed points depends only on the underlying matrix,
, and Æ. The  parameter pulls the xed points towards the center of the
simplex as  becomes small. The role of Æ is harder to quantify. For Matrix
2, very small Æ values (0 < Æ < 0:1) lead to xed points in the region of
(0,0,1) which is very far form the Nash equilibria of the payo matrix. In
both matrices however, small Æ values "pull" the xed points away from
(0,0,1), these points are only stable for very small  values (  0:5 for
Matrix 2 and (  0:7 for Matrix 4).
The stability of xed points depends both on the underlying payo ma-
trix and on the parameter values  and Æ. In the single population case, as
long as  = (0; 1),  has no eect on stability. If  = 1 (Fictitious play)
there is neutral stability.
Looking at two matrices, the "pure" rote learning version of this model
(constraining Æ = 0) does not lead to stable xed points (unless  is very
small which would indicate a poorly specied model).
27
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A Some more on single population stability






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using Haigh's (1975) theorem to reduce the matrix, the entries of the n























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For the model to be asymptotically stable, the eigenvalues of the lin-
earized equation around the xed point have to have negative real parts
(Hirsch & Smale 1974). The eigenvalues of the
~


























































B Two population stability
The P
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and using the same Taylor expansion and re-denition of P as with a single
population (Equations 28-30), J =
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